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Digest: People v. Nelson

Brian S. Thomley

Opinion by Chin, J., expressing the unanimous view of the Court.
Issues
( 1) Did a twenty-six year delay in charging defendant with first-degree
murder, when the DNA forensic technology existed for years before it was
used in defendant's case, violate his state and federal constitutional rights
to a fair trial and due process?
(2) Does the methodology for assessing the statistical significance of a
"cold hit" from a DNA database require proof of general scientific
acceptance under People v. Kelly?
Facts
On February 23, 1976, Ollie George, a 19-year old African-American
college student, disappeared. 1 She was raped and murdered and her body
was discovered two days later. 2 At the time she disappeared, eyewitnesses
placed her in a car later traced to defendant with a man who fit his
description. 3 Other eyewitnesses described a person with a different
description. 4 Having insufficient evidence to focus the investigation on one
person, the case was left "cold ... unsolved but inactive."5
Years later, a DNA sample was obtained from defendant after an
unrelated conviction and entered into a convicted offender database. 6 In
October 2000, the state allocated funds to law enforcement agencies to use
DNA to solve cold sexual assault cases. 7 In July 2001, the county reviewed
Ollie's murder and, comparing the DNA from a semen stain found on her
with a database containing 184,000 individual profiles, found a potential
match with defendant's DNA. 8 In 2002, defendant's DNA was taken and
was found to match several samples, including a vaginal swab, from the
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crime scene. 9 He was charged with first-degree murder. 10
Defendant attempted to dismiss the case because the delay in charging
him with the murder prejudiced his defense. 11 He also objected to the
prosecution's introduction of statistical evidence that the DNA profile on
the vaginal swab would occur at random among unrelated individuals in
about one in 950 sextillion African-Americans, one in 130 septillion
Caucasians, and one in 930 sextillion Hispanics. 12
The jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder. 13 The Court of
Appeal affirmed. 14 The Supreme Court of California granted review. 15
Analysis
I. Delay in Bringing Charges
The Court stated that, in determining whether a criminal defendant's
due process rights to a fair trial are violated by a delay in bringing charges,
the court must balance the prejudice resulting from the delay with the
justification for the delay. 16 Applying this test, the Court found that the
overall prejudice to defendant resulting from precharging delay was
minimal. 17
The Court observed that the federal and state constitutions differ on
when delay is unjustified. 18 The Court said that the federal standard
requires addition to showing of prejudice, an examination of the reasons for
the delay. 19 The Court explained that there are many legitimate reasons
that the government may delay rather than to obtain a tactical advantage
over the accused. 20 Under California law, on the other hand, prejudicial
delay may be unjustified when there was no legitimate reason for the delay,
such that negligent, as well as purposeful, delay may violate due process. 21
The Court clarified that purposeful delay may violate due process under the
balancing test with a relatively weak showing of prejudice, while delay that
is merely negligent would require a greater showing of prejudice to
establish a due process violation. 22
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Applying these principles to the present case, the Court concluded that
the justification for the delay in bringing charges against defendant was
strong. 23 The Court declined to second-guess the prosecution's belief that
it lacked sufficient evidence to charge him until 2002. 24 The Court also
concluded that the delay was "investigatory" rather than negligent by
declining to second-guess how the state allocates its law enforcement
resources. 25
2. Admissibility of the DNA Evidence
The Court began by noting that the general use of forensic DNA
evidence passed the test under People v. Kelly requiring that a new
scientific technique be proven reliable by its general acceptance in the
scientific community. 26
The Court explained that the statistical
significance of the DNA match in this case was gauged by the "product
rule," which calculates the odds that a random person from the relevant
population would have a similar match. 27
Defendant argued that the fact that the match came from a cold hit
from a database and not from comparison with the crime scene evidence
was a new scientific technique that must pass the Kelly test. 28 Defendant
reasoned that, when a single suspect is compared to the crime scene
evidence, the probability statistic reflects a randomly selected person. 29
But in a cold hit case, he said, the suspect is never "randomly" selected
from the general population because the authorities have already compared
the DNA profiles in the database to find him. 30 Thus, he argued, in a cold
hit case the chance of a match is increased. 31
The Court, however, reasoned that experts have endorsed four
different methods for calculating the statistical significance of a match,
including the method used in this case. 32 The only debate between experts
was which of these methods is the most relevant in determining the
significance of a match. 33 Thus, the Court concluded, the product rule met
the Kelly test for admissibility for establishing the rarity of the genetic
profile in a population in a cold hit case. 34 The only question before the
trial court, the Court said, was to determine this method's relevance. 35
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The Court concluded that the product rule was relevant to determining
the rarity of a genetic profile in a cold-hit case. 36 The Court explained that
the "product rule 'represents two concepts: (I) the frequency with which a
DNA profile is expected to appear in a population ('rarity statistic'); and
(2) the probability of finding a match by randomly selecting one person
from the population ('random match probability'). "'37 The Court said that,
even if the product rule in a cold hit case no longer accurately reflects the
random match probability, it still accurately reflects the rarity of the DNA
profile. 38
Holding
The Court held that the delay in bringing charges against defendant
did not violate his due process rights to a fair trial. 39 The Court also held
that the trial court correctly admitted the DNA evidence under the standard
in People v. Kelly. 40
Legal Significance
This decision upholds criminal defendants' due process claims
involving prosecutorial delay by allowing them to proceed when the delay
is merely negligent. But when the delay is for a proper purpose, courts will
show considerable deference to the state's discretion in how it allocates its
investigative resources and whether it decides to bring charges. The
Court's establishment of the admissibility of methods of DNA forensic
analysis in cold hit cases will boost the role of DNA evidence stored in
database in prosecuting crimes left unsolved for decades.
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